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The Feeling of Kinship: Queer Liberalism and the Racialization of Intimacy Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2010 ISBN 9780822347323 RRP US$23.95 (pb)  For those interested in feeling, a seismic shift is taking place. Despite differences in discipline, object and  location, The Promise of Happiness and The Feeling of Kinship embody a shared critical sensibility and a mode of politics that  is embedded in the discursive  terrain  of  this  shift.  Together,  these  texts  track  the  contexts  of  nation building  in  which  ‘happy  families’  manifest  political  investments  in  how  feeling forces  identity  and  its  conceptualisation.  They  variously  locate  antecedents  to  the critical import of feeling in contemporary studies of race, gender, sexuality and class, 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in  traditional  Western  philosophy  and  in  the  insights  of  discursive  and psychoanalytic analysis. The  task  of  doing  a  cultural  politics  of  feeling  attests  not  only  to  the complexities of affective  life, or even to the epistemic challenges ushered  in by the truths of feeling, but to the profound changes afoot in cultural landscapes of identity. Transporting  the  intellectual  study of  feeling  into  the discursive  terrain of  identity augments  the  terms of  analysis  that  ground  the politics  of  identity;  at  stake  is  the ability  to  critique  the  tactility  of  identity  as  a  deployment  of  power.  The  shared ground  of  this  seismic  shift mobilises  registers  of  feeling  to  push  anti‐racist,  anti‐sexist  and  anti‐homophobic  knowledges  beyond  the  spectre  of  their  epistemic stagnation in identitarian  ‘identity politics’ and the conservatism that multicultural agendas of identity in official state discourses on Western liberalism allow. The  politics  of  Ahmed’s  and  Eng’s  projects  are  thus  sutured  not  only  in points  of  convergence  between  the  stated  purviews  of  postcolonial,  queer  and feminist  analysis,  but  in  the  forging  of  shared  sinews  of  analytic  and  historical density that subtend their discourse. These sinews are new degrees of nuance and intensity that articulate feeling’s becoming; the force of feeling as value, as home, as normal, as that which tells—before we understand—who it is that we are, what we are made up of, and what it is that we are doing. I was struck by the commitment to refiguring historical linearity through the articulation of grief. My reading is not necessarily situated in as wide a context and with as long enough of a degustation as these texts deserve, but I am fascinated by the coincidence between the political and epistemic work of rethinking ‘history’ for contemporary movements of identity, and the dis/placing effects of temporalities of feeling  within  identity’s  affective  structures.  This  sinew  of  nuance  and  intensity, forged  in  a  co‐inhabitable  reading  of  the  texts,  generates  new  historical contingencies of identity by opening up specific kinds of historical inquiry particular to  the  feedback  of  feeling;  enfolding  diagrams  of  subjective  and  structural  change are etched  in  the moment when,  in  the words of Lauren Berlant,  ‘the elastic snaps back  on  the  subject  who  no  longer  finds  traction  in  the  ways  of  being  that  had provided continuity and optimism for her’.1 A number of recent calls for papers on the topics of history and the emotions attest to the currency of the authors’ desire to 
Sarah Cefai—Unhappy Families  341 
expand the work of these etchings at the heart of the interface between openings of historical inquiry and the identity politics of feeling. 
—GRIEF’S HISTORY Each chapter of The Feeling of Kinship reconceptualises the time of feeling according to  particular  scenarios  of  cultural  difference.  The  temporality  of  the  politics  of feeling  needs  to  be  understood  in  terms  that  are  particular  to  specific  cultural contexts  or  locales,  yet  that  also  dovetail  with  the  broader  cultural  imperatives informing local grounds of possibility. The  chapter  ‘The  Structure  of  Kinship’  reads  The  Book  of  Salt  and Happy 
Together  to show how the time and space of European modernity  is reframed as a structure  of  feeling  in  which  the  ‘universalizing  narrative  of  European consciousness’  (67)  bestows  affective  histories  to  its  subjects.2  The  psychic  and affective  dimensions  of  the  anticipatory  temporality  of  closeted  subjectivity  are governed by  ‘waiting’,  the  ‘“not yet” of historicism’3 (69) and queer  liberalism. The life‐world  of  Bình,  the  protagonist  of The Book  of  Salt,  ‘emerges  only  between  the time  of  his  Mesdames’  departure  and  arrival,  their  disappearance  and  re‐appearance’. (69) Employed as household chef to Gertrude Stein and Alice B. Toklas ‘during  the  couple’s  famous  residence  in  Paris  as  American  expatriates’,  (59)  the Vietnamese colonial and exiled queer inhabits  ‘a structure of feeling that defies the temporal and spatial logic of modernity’s ceaseless progress’. (69) In  this  chapter,  Eng’s  reading  of Wong Kar‐wai’s  film Happy  Together  also foregrounds  the  contingency  between  feeling  and  temporal  indeterminacy.  The film’s portrayal of Lai and Ho’s South–South migration  from Hong Kong  to Buenos Aires enfolds  their  ‘interminable  cycle of  abandonment, breaking up,  and  “starting over”’,  (79)  and  ‘the  impossibility  of  [their]  domesticity’,  (79)  within  ‘the indeterminate  passing  of  time  and  space  in  between  capitalist  systematization  of labor and wages’. (82) I  would  like  to  further  examine  the  connection  between  modernity’s ‘disciplining of  time and  space  into  the political  logic  of  liberal  humanism and  the economic  logic  of  liberal  capitalism’,  (69)  and  the  reliance  of  these  constructs  on their investments in masculinity. For example, Bình’s relationship with Lattimore—’a man of dubious racial origins’ (71)—is an ‘on‐again‐off‐again relationship’, (71) ‘a 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private without a public’, (74) that ‘slips in between the cracks of an Enlightenment compulsion to evaluate and interrogate, to organise and know’. (71) In this example, my  question  is:  how  would  Eng’s  critique  be  extended  by  analysing  Bình  and Lattimore’s mode of inhabitation and its temporal qualities as lacking the certitude of possessive masculine subjectivity, in other words, as structurally feminine? The  ‘crossing  of  fiction  into  history  and  history  into  fiction’  (64)  in  these texts enables a representation of an experience of temporality in which ‘[d]ifference does  not  return  as  sameness’.  (74)  The  epistemic  status  of  fiction  enables  the construction  of  ‘alternative  time  and  space—other  forms  of  racial  knowing  and being—that  are  more  than  just  a  negation  or  reversal  of  the  dominant  terms  of relation’  (75)  in  the  linear progression  from modernism  to postmodernism  that  is ‘constituted  through  disavowed  and  sublated  colonial  histories  of  race’.  (74)  The cultural  imperative is to forget. But Eng retrieves the ghostly presence of histories, questioning: ‘What possible pasts and what possible futures must be denied in order for this particular narrative of queer freedom and progress to take hold?’ (74) This segues  into  the  larger  question  of  the  book:  ‘how  does  queer  liberalism  not  only depend on but  also  demand  the  completion  of  the  racial  project,  the  triumph of  a colorblind US society as an achieved and settled past?’ (74) The following chapter,  ‘The Language of Kinship’, makes a slightly different use  of  time.  In  the  context  of  transnational  adoption,  as  represented  by  Deann Borshay  Liem’s  documentary  First  Personal  Plural,4  rather  than  bring  into  relief modes  of  being  made  possible  by  temporal  multiplicity,  Eng  describes  how memories of  concrete  experiences  are  erased  to produce a  temporal  linearity  that mirrors conventional family embodiments of narrative time. The protagonist of this story, rather than finding ways to be otherwise within ‘the suppression of difference …  the  collective  refusal  to  see  difference  in  the  face  of  it’,  (95)  is  caught  in,  even immobilised by, the narratives that press upon her. Unlike Bình, Lai and Ho, whose experiences  resist  or  counter‐occupy  nationalistic  process  of  categorisation, Borshay  Liem  cannot  overcome  the  fraught  experience  of  cultural  and  familial dispossession, confessing:  ‘“There wasn’t room in my mind for two mothers.”’ (94) The  political  context  that  Eng  gives  this  statement  of  psychic  reality  has  a relationship  to  that  of  the  previous  chapter,  but  it  is  also  something  altogether different. 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Leaving a country of origin involves mourning ‘a host of losses both concrete and  abstract’.  (115)  In  the  context  of  diasporic  communities,  this  mourning  is managed communally, through the  intergenerational and  intersubjective experience of racial melancholia. Yet the recognition of the loss of Korea is not permitted by the adoptee’s  family,  who  manage  ‘the  adoptee’s  affect’:  ‘the  contraction  of  Korean history  into  the  privatized  boundaries  of  the  white  American  family  is  finessed through the management and control of Borshay Liem’s emotional life’. (114) Here, the target of managing affect is the management of racial difference.  In  Eng’s  analysis,  the  erosion  of  boundaries  in  the  case  of  transnational adoption is quite different from the rendering of in‐betweens that disrupt modernist narratives  in The Book of Salt and Happy Together. Whereas  the adoptee’s affect  is 
managed, it is ‘the autonomy of affect’5 (81) that permits Lai and Ho to ‘occupy their own  alternative  human  life‐world  “in  between”’,  despite  the  impossibility  of  their relationship.  In  First  Person  Plural,  cultural  practices  smooth  over  political differences; the assimilation of spatial discord into the smooth temporalities of the neoliberal nation‐state enacts a privatisation of race that is also a forgetting of race. The contribution of a feminist perspective could be considered here also: could it be that gender—the gender of Borshay Liem and the gendered structure of the trade in which  her  experience  takes  place—is  a  significant  aspect  of  the  structural differences that impede Borshay Liem’s access to ‘the psychic time and space of the in‐between’? (81) Like  Eng,  Ahmed  draws  significantly  Freud’s  theory  of melancholy—of  the inability  to  name,  avow  and  mourn  certain  losses—particularly  in  her  chapter ‘Melancholic  Migrants’.  Both  scholars  eke  out  a  sort  of  distortion  of  linear temporality  through  unpacking  grief,  loss  and  various  emotional,  psychic  and affective states identifiable under the psychoanalytic rubric of melancholia. Ahmed  also  finds  a  return  that  is  a  haunting:  ‘It  is  the  very  desire  to assimilate, to let the past go, which returns to haunt the nation. It is the migrant who wants  to  integrate  who  may  bear  witness  to  the  emptiness  of  the  promise  of happiness’.  (158)  Immigration  is  a  ‘national  ideal,  a  way  of  imagining  national happiness’, (158) and yet, it is the experiences of those whose desires are caught in the will to assimilate that show up as failed assimilation; the desire to belong reveals that which jars and rubs and strips and dismantles, the ‘attachments that cannot be 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reconciled’. (158) In this context, ‘holding on to a memory’ gains ‘ethical importance … as a way of keeping a connection to what and who survives in the present’. (158) Ahmed’s  reading  of  the  film  If  These  Walls  Could  Talk  26  in  the  chapter ‘Unhappy  Queers’  reveals  the  related  but  differently  palpable  pain  of  loss  in  the context of sexuality. Like Eng, Ahmed complicates the progressive narrative of queer freedom  through  a  theorisation  of  loss.  Ahmed  expands  the  sensitivity  of  our interpretative gauges to the multiplicity of pressures loss exerts on the subject, and to  the myriad manifestations of  loss  feelings  the desire  for happiness can entail or represent.  Ahmed  locates  the  representation of  feminist  and queer movement  as  that which facilitates the happiness of queer existence: ‘Feminist and queer activisms are the mediating  point,  as  “what” must  take  place  to  get  from happy  heterosexuality (which as we know creates unhappiness conditions for queers) to queer happiness.’ (107–8)  If  These Walls  Could  Talk  2  tells  the  story  of  lesbian  procreation  through reimagining ‘the world as if there is no discrimination’. (113) The film is comprised of  three  short  films,  each  of  which  follows  a  different  lesbian  relationship  at  a particular historical moment in the United States. Ahmed shows how the ‘possibility of injury is displaced into the future, which becomes a promise, as if the future itself is what will overcome injury or any other signs of hurt … the disturbing thought of discrimination  is not  allowed  to  interrupt queer happiness’.  (113) This  is  feeling’s shift  of  the political  terrain  of  identity:  having  children  is  not  (only)  a  question  of wanting to become like straight people, but of recovery and hope for a better life, a life less burdened by the pain of loss and lack of access to sovereign subjectivity. In Ahmed’s words: This  short  film  shows  us  the  pain  that  follows  from  the  failure  of recognition.  Indeed,  the happiness of  this  film reminds us  that  the desire for  recognition  is not necessarily  about having  access  to  a  good  life.  It  is not even necessarily an aspiration for something: rather it comes from the experience of what is unbearable, what cannot be endured. The desire for a bearable life is a desire for a life where suffering does not mean that you lose you bearings, where you become unhoused. (111) Ahmed’s phenomenological understanding of  feeling,  that privileges  the experience of  feeling over  the autonomy of affect,  refigures  the political desire  for recognition 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from the standpoint of the experience of emotion that is enfolded with the structural lack of recognition. Theorising the frail and jagged edges of bearable  life opens the way for a discussion of recognition that is not about the ability of the subject to hold an  identity  that  categorically  describes  who  she  or  he  is  but,  rather,  is  about  the provision of terms in which a subject has access to further recognition of what they already know to be their own experience.  
—HAPPINESS KINSHIPS Reinterpreting historicity through the time of feeling is one among many connective arcs inscribed at the interface between these texts, which challenge our awareness of the relationship between emotional and affective experience and the nationalistic imperative to manage cultural minorities. Both Eng and Ahmed expand the political horizons  of  feeling  and  cultural  politics  with  exciting  complexity:  both  books  are brilliant in ways impossible for me to convey in their ‘review’. In  seeking  to  understand  the  contingency  of  US  colourblindness  on  the (legislative  and  cultural)  privatisation  of  race—that  Eng  calls  ‘the  racialization  of intimacy’—structures of feeling (Raymond Williams) are given a psychic life (Freud) as  embodiments  of  the  neoliberal  refusal  to  see  the  public  difference  of  race.  In ‘following the word happiness’ (14) Ahmed examines ‘how happiness participates in making  things  good’,  (13)  reconfiguring  the  philosophical,  political  and  personal landscape  of  value  that  saturates  our  claims  to  want  to  be  happy,  to  make  one another happy. The feminist killjoy, the unhappy queer and the melancholic migrant are  figures  in  a  discursive  structure  of  happiness  that  displaces  the  cause  of unhappiness onto those who suffer unhappiness feelings. One concern  I continue  to hold regards  the ubiquity of  ‘affect’.  In academic circles, I hear affect enunciated as a noun to describe the state of being affected. This enunciation is outside the context of psychology, which is the genealogical context in which  ‘the  affects’  are  subjectively  and  objectively  perceivable  things.  There  is  a slipperiness  around  the  passage  of  psychological  concepts  into  critical  discourse that  seems  to  lose  accountability  in  the  generic  applicability  of  affect  to  all  things embodied and relational.  Inhabiting a migratory  ‘between’ myself, what  I might be hearing is more of a pronunciation than an enunciation. In any case, the concept of affect  is  still  undergoing  some  challenging  interdisciplinary  translations  and,  in 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these,  it  can  be  difficult  to  keep  hold  of  the  genealogically  intended meaning.  It  is another  project  to  get  to  the  discursive  mechanics  supporting  the  suspiciously current  valorisation  of  affect  in  relation  to  other  terms,  such  as  sensation  and emotion, when we  are  so  caught  up  in  the  affective  sway  of  affect’s  propensity  to describe what it is that we are so interested in describing. I do wonder, though, how to get to these mechanics while also making use of this very propensity as so richly and generously bequeathed to critical discourse by Ahmed and Eng. Eng  is wholeheartedly  psychoanalytic  and  embraces Massumi’s  distinction between  emotion  and  affect.7  My  question  here,  given  the  predominance  of psychoanalysis in the American academy for some time, is: what is happening at this moment  when  what  have  had  currency  as  psychoanalytic  readings  become translated  as  affective  ones?  I  am  curious  not  only  about  the  translatability  of psychoanalysis into affect, which as a moment has a brief history through the work of scholars like Teresa Brennan, but about the recoding of terms. Call me paranoid, but  as  the  language  of  affect  expands,  the  language  of  power  and  power’s  effects seems  to  be  recede.  All  the  while,  ‘affect’  in  The  Feeling  of  Kinship  could  be genealogically located as a use of psychoanalysis in the discursive analysis of power. While  continuing  to  utilise  psychoanalysis  with  phenomenology  to  think about  affect  as  ‘sticky’—’[a]ffect  is what  sticks,  or what  sustains  or  preserves  the connection between  ideas,  values,  and objects’  (230)—emotion  doesn’t  even make an appearance in the appendix of The Promise of Happiness.8 The discursive tide of affect triumphs, despite Ahmed’s productive resistance to the pressure to privilege either term in The Cultural Politics of Emotion.9 I do think we need to be wary about the  ease  which  with  the  conceptual  register  of  affect  supersedes  terms  such  as power,  effect  and  emotion,  in  part  merely  because  such  a  supersession,  while generative,  also  acts  to  flatten,  universalise  or  cohere  possibilities  for  thinking feeling,  possibilities  that  Eng  and  Ahmed  are  so  committed  to  keeping  alive  and open.  The  idea of happiness and  the  idea of  family are so  intractable  to  the daily shape of emotional experience, that it is with the politics of these terms ‘happiness’ and ‘kinship’ that a politics of feeling begins. The feeling of happiness and the feeling of  kinship  slip  and  slide  in  and  out  of  the  texts;  as  Ahmed  follows  the  word 
happiness, I follow the feelings that come and go in the authors’ followings. As their 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etchings  are  in  the betweens of  affective  and psychic  structures of  self  and world, original carvings in zones of analytic indeterminacy, it is certainly not the case that some clumsy desire for ‘representation’ is getting in the way of how we really feel. I did, however, so often crave more of an attentiveness to the quality of the power of these  feelings  of  kinship  and  happiness;10  feelings  are  made  political  in  their discourse, of course, but also because of the capacities of our feeling bodies to soak up  and  articulate  their  cultural  refrains.  I  know  that  these  feelings  are  there,  the objects of these books slipping and sliding as feelings do: it  is not a criticism, I  just want more. And I do, in the words of Leona, ‘just want to be, happy’.11   — 




   VOLUME17 NUMBER1 MAR2011 348 
 acceptance from many scholars working on affect, in fields such as geography, sociology, and cultural studies. See Parables for the Virtual. 8 To illustrate, Ahmed describes the image of the happy housewife as having an ‘affective power’, (53) whereas Eng talks about sites of ‘affective density’, (70) and describes crying as a ‘language of affect’. (114) This deserves further illustration and discussion, which I hope to stimulate. 9 Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2004. 10 Particularly reading Ahmed, whose passion for phenomenology seems to bring feelings closer, and yet somehow all the more apart. 11 Leona Lewis, ‘Happy’, Syco, 2009. In the chapter ‘Feminist Killjoys’, (50–87) Ahmed locates the feminist subject as a ‘killjoy’, refusing to share in happiness causes that are structurally replicated and cover over the pain of others. After identifying how the promise of happiness embodied by the ‘happy housewife’ (51) produces the ‘loss of other possible ways of living’, (79) which lies behind ‘how happiness demands adjusting your body to world that has already taken shape,’ (79) Ahmed resolves that: ‘Feminism involves challenging the very “pressure” of happiness, the way it restricts the possibilities for finding excitement, of being excited.’ (69) I cannot help think, however, that at work in this distinction is a feeling of happiness with an epistemological status that always recedes from view. Aren’t feelings of being excited, of feeling happy, always going to be caught up in a hegemony of ‘happiness scripts’ (59) at some level of interpretation of the subject? While Ahmed claims to only follow ‘the word’ happiness, (198) there is more to say about ‘being excited’ as happiness feelings, and as feelings that tell us whether or not we have become ‘happy housewives’.    Shortly after Ahmed’s presentation of ‘Killing Joy’ in Sydney in September 2009, singer Leona Lewis (winner of the British television talent series The X Factor (Talkback Thames, FremantleMedia, SYCOtv) in 2008) released the single ‘Happy’. The chorus goes: ‘So what if it hurts me | So what if I break down | So what if this world just throws me off the edge | And my feet run out of ground | I gotta find my place | I wanna hear my sound | Don’t care about all the pain in front of me | I’m just trying to be | HAPPY’. I would like to know what Ahmed thinks about Leona’s happiness. We don’t know what will make Leona happy, and she might not know herself, but we do know that she doesn’t want to ‘stand by the side … safe as could be’. Is Leona’s happiness a feminist script that slips and slides between figures such as the happy housewife and the hag; as that which unsettles the binary frame delineating that which is imposed from that which resists? Or is Leona’s happiness that which we move toward as we are moved by the sound of her moving, the movement she portrays in the emotional honesty of her voice: ‘I just want to be…’? How is this betweenness, and the recognition that we might not know what will make us happy—only what happiness is when we feel our hope for its becoming—important to our re‐engagements with happiness as ‘the political horizon in which feminist claims are made’? (59) 
